Why the US would struggle to overcome Russia’s nuclear anti-satellite weapon
A Falcon 9 rocket launching 24 satellites from Space Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida. (Photo: US Space Force)
The recent announcement that Russia has been working on a nuclear on-orbit anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon has shed light on US concerns about succeeding in contested space scenarios and raised questions about whether the Pentagon is prepared to overcome an attack from this type of capability.
Although the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) for FY 2024 includes more than US$5 billion investment in space and satellite facilities, systems and technologies over the current fiscal year, defeating attacks of atomic-capable platforms in the domain would be complicated for the US Department of Defense (DoD).
Speaking to Shephard, Kari Bingen, director of the aerospace security project within the US-based think tank CSIS, explained that the impact of a nuclear detonation in space would create an electromagnetic pulse as the energy omitted transmits through the atmosphere.
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“If it [the amount of energy] is really large, it will fry electronics on the earth, everything from your cell phone to electronics in your cars,” Bingen noted.
Another possible effect would be high levels of radiation being trapped within Earth’s magnetic fields.
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists data platform, in 2023, there were 7,560 operational satellites orbiting the Earth. A total of 5,184 assets belong to the US, of which 4,741 are commercial, 246 military, 167 governmental and 30 civilian.
The majority of US satellites are commercial and have not been designed to resist or accumulate higher doses of radiation. As a result, many commercial assets would be affected, degraded and even destroyed by atomic ASAT weapons.
“Our nation’s nuclear communications and missile warning satellites that detect ICBM missile launchers are designed to detect nuclear detonations and withstand high-radiation environments,” Bingen noted. “But those are very exquisite, expensive systems that cost more than a billion dollars.”
As the US relies on satellite communication (SATCOM) in multiple areas including security, defence, commerce, transportation, meteorology and finances, an adversary offensive action would deeply affect the country.
In February 2024, White House national security communications advisor John Kirby claimed that any capability that could disrupt and have some impact on services on Earth “should be of concern to anybody”.
Questioned about US capacity to defend against the Russian anti-satellite system supposedly under development, Kirby stated he would “definitively” not speak about Washington’s strategic deterrent capabilities, noting “we just don’t talk about that publicly”.

Meanwhile, Pentagon press secretary Maj Gen Pat Ryder stated that there was a recognition that space has continued to become more congested and contested with strategic competitors such as China and Russia deploying solutions that could threaten US national security and commercial assets.
While Ryder did not disclose details on the Pentagon’s inventory, he claimed that US Space Force’s Space Systems Command provided “the operational capability to integrate national or military space capabilities” which includes “ensuring that we’re able to maintain our operations, but also looking at protecting and defending capabilities in space”.
From Bingen’s perspective, the threat posed by nuclear-capable ASAT weapons “would be very hard to defend against”.
In considering the threat, both the government and the private sector have been changing their stances by focusing on diverse satellite architectures and investing in manoeuvring capacities to enable satellites to move out of the way of potential threats.
“Rather than relying on five satellites to do your imagery collection or your communications, you now have hundreds to thousands of satellites up in orbit,” Bingen said. “If some fraction of them get targeted, you can still continue your mission.”
The FY2024 NDAA included plans to have an integrated and resilient satellite communications architecture for the US Space Force with requirements for small satellite communications constellations. The addition of the requirements intended to provide support for global X-band coverage and support for secure communications waveforms.
The DoD has been also assessing the potential integration of small assets into the enterprise satellite communications management and control (ESC–MC).
Additionally, the NDAA allocated funds towards advanced component development and prototypes of low-earth orbit satellite capabilities to research, develop, test and evaluate non-geostationary, transportable satellite terminals.

Kirby claimed that while Russia’s pursuit of a nuclear ASAT capability was “troubling”, however, there was “no immediate threat to anyone’s safety”.
“We are not talking about a weapon that can be used to attack human beings or cause physical destruction here on Earth,” Kirby remarked. “We have been closely monitoring this Russian activity and we will continue to take it very seriously.”
The Kremlin’s interest in anti-satellite capabilities is not new as Moscow started conducting tests with ASAT systems in the 1960s during the Soviet Union era.
The country was reported to have cyber and jamming technologies to interfere in SATCOM signals in addition to ASAT missiles in its inventory.
Working on a nuclear on-orbit anti-satellite weapon, however, would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty of which Russia was a signatory.
“If the Russians are developing a capability to put nuclear weapons on satellites that are constantly orbiting the Earth, I think that is incredibly dangerous and a significant security risk,” Bingen added.
Away from Moscow, China has also been reported to have ASAT weapons in its inventory. In 2007, Beijing destroyed a weather satellite using kinetic capacities, resulting in debris orbiting the Earth.
In 2013, the Chinese government announced the launch of a suborbital rocket carrying a scientific payload, which was considered an ASAT system by the international community. Five years later, in 2018, Chinese state media announced a test with an exoatmospheric ballistic missile with the potential to be used in anti-satellite missions.
“Senior DoD leaders [have] increasingly expressed concern that our adversaries, like China, [are putting] more capabilities into space,” Bingen concluded.
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